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Universiry.With few excepàons, the liurature on the role of capacity as a straugic entry deurrent
has assumed Cournoc compeààon in the post-entry game. In contrast, our model is in the spirit
of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983): the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity
levels before compeàng in price. Inuresting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to
build, i.e. cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. Depending on the sius
of the Cixed set-up cost, the cost of capacity and the relaàve costs of producàon, our model
produces a wide spectrum ofequilibrium behaviors. Using a"reverse-judo" tacàc a cost
disadvantaged incumbent may limit his capaciry to induce the entrant to respond less
aggressively. When che incumbent is equally or more efficient, a stochasàc version of Gelman
and Salop's (1983) judo equilibrium may arise. Entry accommodaàon can also result in the
Stackelberg outcomc, or the equilibria from Dixit's (1980) quanàry-setting game. In conttast to
much previous work, we find that when entry is deurred the incumbent tnay hold idle capacity.
Our model thus provides a unified framework in which several equilibrium phenomena
previously suggested in the liurature appear as special cases, while at the same time suggesting
some new ones. Furthermore, it generaus clear predicàons about the circumstances under which
these different outcomes are likely to occur.1. Introduction
Most theories of the determinants of industrial concentraáon assign an important role to
scale cconomies, eicher ac the plant or the firm level. However, U.S. manufacturing appears to be
considerably more concentrated than would be warranted by scale economies alone. For
example, in nine of the twelve industries examined by Scherer et al. (1975), the market share of
the top three ftrms in cach industry ranges from two to ten times higher than the market share
necessary to exploit scale economies (with an avetage of 4.4 over the whole sample). One
possible explanaáon for this observed divergence is that strategic actions undertaken by
incumbent fums can magnify the advantages conferred by scale economies. The literature on
capacity as a strategic entry detetrent (surveyed below) advances such a theory: by building
capacity in excess of what would be opámal in the absence of an entry threat, early incumbents
can deter further entry, or at least reduce the scale of such entry.
This paper uses the Bertrand-Edgeworth modcl of price compeááon to reexamine the role
of capacity precommitment as an entry deterring device. More precisely, we assume that there
are two firms, an incumbent and a potenáal entrant (henceforth called the ontrant), that compete
in a market for a homogeneous good. The firms play a three-stage noncooperaáve game. F'u-st,
the incumbent chooses its capaciry. Having observed the incumbent's capacity level, the entranc
then selects capacity. In the [hird stage, the firms simultaneously set prices.
Allen (1993) first analyzed a game of this type. Our paper differs from Allerts(1993)
analysis in two important ways.l Fu-st, we allow firms to have different unit costs of producáon
up to capacity. This enables us to examine the role of dífferenáal efficiency in deterrnining the
nature of precommitment; with asymmetric efficiencies a firm may want to precommit to be
large (as in Dixit (1980)) or small (as in Gelman and Salop (1983)). Second, we characterize the
equilibríum for arbitrary (but idenácal) costs ofcapacity and fixed set up costs. A central theme
IAllen (1993) shows that when ftrms are equally efficicnG ~ere exists a range of fixed costs over
which the incumbent can profitably deter entry. However, the paper neither characterizes the
optimal entry detetring strategy, nor the region over which deterrence is feasible or optimal. It is
also mute on the nattue of equihbrium when deterrence is either not feasible or not opámal.z
of our paper is that the distincáon between fixed cosu of entry, the cost of capacity, and the cost
of producáon up to capaaity is crucial to the understanding of a wide range ofeconomic
phenomena.
The contemporary analysis of entry deterrence can be seon as an outgrowth of the limit
pricing model of Bain (1956), Sylos-Labini (1969), and Modigliani (1958). According to Bain
(1956, p. 98), potenáal entrants act as if they expected that upon entry established fums would
maintain output at the pre-entry level.2 The decision whether to enter the industry is therefore
based upon a comparison of the residual demand curve (industry output minus the pre-entry
output ofincumbent fums) and potential entrants' cost condiáons. If there are economies of
scale in producáon, or if entrants are cost disadvantaged, established hrms can taise their pre-
entry output level up to the point where entry is effecávely deten-ed. By its nature this
framework compresses firms' long-run entry and siu decisions and their short-run producáon
and pricing decisions into the same period. Later models of entry detcrrence (e.g. Dixit (1979))
have formally separated these two decision periods, and have argued that the thrcat to maintain
output at the pre-entry level is not subgame perfect
Our paper differs from most previous analyses of entry deterrence in iu assumpáons
regarding compeááon in the post-entry game. Spence (1977) assumes that the post-entry game
is perfectly competiàve, i.e. that price clears all capaciry from the maricet Dixit (1980), Spulber
(1981), Ware (1985) and Bulow, Geanakoplos and HIemperer (1985) examine the case where the
post-entry game is Cottmot. Spulber (1981), Saloner (1985) and Basu and Singh (1990) examine
entry when the post-entry game is Stackelberg quantity-setting.
Post-entry Bertrand competition has remained relatively neglected. Dixit (1980) and
Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) examine Bertrand compeááon in the final stage in a
differenáated products model. Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klempcrcr (1985, p. 181) note that
with homogeneous goods, final stage price-setting leads to marginal cost pricing and, therefore,
2Iitis assumpáon has become known as the Sylos postulate.3
if the entrant's constant rnarginal costs are at least as gtzat as the incumbent's and if there is a
fixed cost of entry "we would never expect to observe entry followed by price compeátion." 3
Our paper demonstratcs that this conclusion is an anzfact of a modelling straugy which allows
capacity to be inscant:uteously acijustrá upward in the post-entry game. BotTOwing temtinology
from the real business cycles literattue (see Kydland and Prescott (1982)), we call this
assumpàon no time to build . This assumpàon is maintaincri in both the Dixit and BGK models
(as in most of the other models above)4 While its implicaáons are innocuous for quattáty-
setting games, this is not true for post-entry price-setting, as noted by Edgeworth (1925). Our
paper departs from these previous attempts to deal with post-entry price-setting by assuming that
capacity requires time to build . Specifically, we assume that the incttmbent and entrant may
sequenáally precommit to capaciry levels. However, once these capaciàes aze in place there is
no upward adjustmen[ in the post-enay stage.5 Prices aze set subject to the limitaàons on sales
imposed by the capacity constraints.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth approach to modelling post~ntry compeáàon is appealing for
several reasons. First, it is itnmune to the Bettrandcriáque; firms set prices. This avoids the
Cournot model's reliance on the hypotheàcal aucáoneer who sets prices to clear quanááes in the
market. Moreover, for most mazkets a strong intuiáve argument can be made that prices are
more easily adjusted than quanààes, and hence can be set contingent on the quanááes available.
This leads naturally to a model where price fotmaáon is the final stage of a mulástage game.
A cornmon defense of the Cournot model is based on the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
argument that simultaneous quanáty choice followed by simultaneous priee-setting can yield a
3This statement is supponed by Sàglicz (1987) and is also attábuted to Gilbert in the discussion
following Gilbert (1986).
~More specifically, although neither papcr is explicit about the timing, it is assumed that
capaciàes can be ad~usted upwatd after pnces have been set.
5Ware (1985) also assumes that the incumbent and entrant sequenáally preconunit to capaciry
levels. However, he assumes post-enay Coumot competiáon and instantaneous ad]ustment of
capaciry at that tune .4
Cournot outcome.ó However, thete is a growing consensus among thcoreácians that the choice
of a quanàty in the Coumot model should be interpreted as a levcl of capital investment or scalc
of operaáon.~ It therefore seems inappropriate to appeal to the Kreps-Scheinkman result to
justify post-entry Cournot competiáon in a model in which capital may be precommitted. A
more natural approach is to ttplace the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) assumpáon of
simultancous capacity choice by sequenàal precommitment in the choice of capacity.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth approach to modellíng post-entry compeááon also has another.
hitherto largcly unnoàced, advantage over the no titne [o build approach: when futed entry costs
are either nonexistent or not too large, the latter approach is incapab[eofgeneratingafirst-
mover advantagefrom eapaeity preeommibnent . Indeed, consider Dixit's (1980) analysis, in
which an incumbent (firm 1) and a potenàal entrant (firm 2) sell imperfect subsàtutcs. After the
incumbent chooses a capaciry level kl, firm 2 decides whether or not to enter. In the event entry
occurs, both firms simultaneously announce a price and expand capacity to saàsfy any demand
that can be profitably sold at these prices.e 7ite situaàon is depicted in Figure 1. Zhe two curves
MM' and NN' represent the incumbent's best response funcàons, the fotmer when capaciry costs
matter and the latter when capacity costs are sunk. 7ite curve EE' is the potenàal entrant's best
6Sce, however, Davidson and Deneckere (1986) who show chat this result is sensiáve to che
choice of raàoning rule, and Deneckett and Kovenock (1989b) who show that, evcn with the
raáoning tule used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), the equivalence need not hold with
different unit costs of producàon up to capaciry. Moteover, as Allen and Hellwig (1986) show,
simultaneous price and quanàty choices do not, in genetal, lead to Cournot outcomes under
proportional raàoning.
~For instance, Shapiro (1990), referring to Kreps attd Scheinkman , statcs 'They take thc view, to
which I aáhere, that capital is a relaàvely sluggislt varíable, whettas prices can be adjusted
rapidly. This leads to a model of capacity compeààon followed by pricing compeááon." Tirole
(1988, p. 217) puts it motz forcefully when he siates "... the two-stage game is meant to convey
the idea that ptice competiàon is the futal stage of competition and the idea that scale decisions
must be made before firms ancive on the market. ... what we mean by quantiry compeàtion is
rea!!y achoice ofscale tiratdetermínes thefirm's costfunctions (sic) andthus determines the
conditions ojprice competition." (Original italics)
BMore prccisely, the post-entry game is adifferznàated products price-setting game where firm 2
has a constant marginal cost of (c2tr) for all levels of output, and fum 1 has a constant marginal
cost equal to cl for output levels below kl, and (cltr) for output levels above kl, whett; r is the
urut cost ofcapacity, and cl and cZ ate the rzspecàve unit variable producàon costs.5
response funcàon (whcre capaciry costs still matter). In a simultaneous move price-setting game,
the equilibrium would thus occur at the point T in the diagtam. However, because in the post-
entry stage the incumbent's capaciry costs at output levcls xt S kt are effectively sunk, the
incumbent's reacàon funcàon in the second stage of the two-stage game is NN' for output levels
xl 5 kl and MM' for output levels xl ~ kl. The curve xl - kl repttsents all (pl, p2)
combinaáons at which the incumbent's demand is equal to kl, i.e. where the incumbent is
capacity constrained unless he expands beyond kl. The overall best-response funcàon of the
incumbcnt in thc post-entry gamc is therefore representcd by the heavy line in Figure 1. With the
choice ofk i as depicted. che second stage equilibrium would occur at T. By varying the pro-
entry choice of kt, the incumbent can secure any point along the segment TV of the potenàal
entrant's best-response funcàon. This leads Dixit (1980, p. 105) to mistakenly conclude that "a
limited leadership possibiliry arise(s) by virtue of the established firm's advantage in being the
fitst [o make a commitment to capacity." Indeed, in the analogous quantity-setting game which
he analyses earlier, the leadership possibility is limited because the line segment TV may not
inetude the Stackelberg point S. In that case V is the incumbenc's most prefertsd outcome. For
the price-setàng game, the Stackelberg point can be found by supetimposing the incumbent's
isoprofit contours onto Figure 1; see Figure 2. Since S lies to the right of T,9 the most preferred
outcome on the segment TV now occurs at the duopoly point T. In contrast to Dixit, we
concludc that in differentiatcd product price-setting games with no time to build, the ability to
sink investment costs conjers no strategie advantage to the ineutnbent . Intuitively, the
incumbent would like to precommit to a capaciry below the duopoly level in order to soften the
post-entry compeàáon.l~ With no time to build, a commitment to restrict capacity to the
Stackelberg level is not credible, and the best the incumbent can do is enjoy duopoly profits. It
should also be emphasiud that while the above tzsult was derived under the assumption of zero
9At the point T, the first order effect on the incumbent's profits of increasing pl is zero, but the
fust order effect of an increase in P2 is posiàve. Consequently S must be to the right of T.
taI'his is the "puppy dog" effect emphasized by Fudenberg and Tuole (1984).6
fixed entry costs, the reasoning remains valid as long as the profits of fitzrt 2 at the point V- net
of fixed entry costs - are positive.
The Bertrand-Edgewotth approach to straugic entry deterrence ís also appealing because
of the array of qualitatively distinct outcomes that are generated as subgame perfect equilibria in
tho resulting game. Entry may be bloclcaded, deurred, or accommodated, depending on the
configuration of costs. In cascs where entty is successfully deurred, ezcessive capaciry built to
deur entry may be utilized compleuly or may be lcft partially idlc.[ t That is, the equilibrium
price of the incumbent may or may not clear iu entire production capaciry from thc mazkct,
depending on the cosc parameters.
The exisunce of a subgame perfect equilibrium involving idle capaciry to deter cntry is of
independent interest While a number of models in the existing literacure obtain idle capacity [o
deter entry, these models all rely on nonstandard assumptions concenung behavior or timing.
Spence (1977) obtains idle capacity, but assumes that firrtts produce at full capacity in the post-
entry game. Such behaviorcan only be justified if the post-entry game is perfectly competitive,
an assumption which seems at odds with the small number of competitors present in the market.
Indecd. Dixit (1980) has argued that Spence's result arises becausc entrants believe noncrediblc
threats regarding the incumbent's post-entry output. When an opponent entets thc market, his
increase in quantity or rcduction in price produces an inward shift in the incumbent's residual
demand curve. The incumbenc then responds rationally by teducing his output. Consequently,
any capacity that was idle before entry will tzmain idle after entry, and so will not deter enuy.
Since capacity costs are positive, no rational incumbent will ever choose to install idle capacity.
Bulow, Geanakoplos and HIemperer (1985) rzgain idle capacity in an example in which only
crcdible threats are believed. Howevcr, they require that the monopolist's tzsidual dcmand
funetion bceomes sufficiently mocz elastic upon entry that his marginal revenue increases. This
will make it rational for the incumbent to raise output in the post-entry game. However, upward
l1By excessive capacity, we mean capaciry that is built solely for strategic reasons, i.e. capacity
in cxcess of the level a monopo6st wouldchoose were his markct unchallenged.sloping portions in the quanáty best-response funcáon cannot occur for concave demand
functions. Lastly, Spulbcr (1981) has demonstrated that idle capacity may result if the
incumbent maintains his fust-movcr advantage beyond the capaciry-setting pcriod into the (post-
cntry) ourput-setting pcriod.lZ Unlike any of the abovc papcrs, the presentpaper provides an
explanaáon of why holding idle capaciry to deter entry can be rational, while maintaitting a post-
entry simultaneous move structure, subgame petfecáon, and standard assumpáons about
demand. In our model, idle capaciry may prove useful because, in the mixed strategy
equilibrium which results following entry, the incumbent only reduces output when he is
undercut by the entrant. Whenevcr the incumbent is lower priced, he raises output, thereby
partially utilizing his idle capaciry and reducing the entrant's expected profits.
When entry is accommodated in our model, the incumbent may behave according to the
Sylos Postulate, so that price is driven down to the level that clears all capacity, or he may
provide a stochastic price umbre[launder which the entrant can price. In the latter instance, the
incumbent stochasácally reduces output below capacity.13 Following Faith (1990) we provide
condiáons on the cost parameters that detem[irte which strategy the incumbent follows. When
prices clear producáon capaciáes, the classical Stackelberg eqtulibrium sometimes anses. In
othcr cascs, the outcome duplicates the equilibria in Dixit's (1980) qttantity-setáng model. When
entry is accommodatcd by a(stochasác) reducáon in output, the result tnay best be described as a
simultaneous price-setting version of Gelman and Salop's (1983) "judo" equilibrium. The
incumbent sets a large capaciry and the entrant remains small to discourage intense price
compenáon.14 By relating the existence ofthe 5tackelberg andjudo outcomes to the values of
12lïtis method of generating idle capacity to deter entry was rediscovered by Basu and Singh
(1990).
t3~en in equilibrium entry is successfully deterrcd. this rype of behavior is also exhibited in
off-thc equilibrium-path subgames following entry. When entry is deterred with excessive but
not idle capacity, off the cquilibrium path post-entry behavior may involve either Sylos-like
behavior or stochasác output tràucàon (below capactty). When idle capaciry is held in deterring
enrry, off the equilibrium path entry will involve only stochasác outpnt reducaon below capaciry.
t~ihis may occur even if the entrant is more efficient (see also Faith (1990)).0
the cost parameters, our model provides a unifying framework in which these outcomes appear
as special cases.
As is evident from the above discussion, thc Bcrtrand-Edgeworth model is also of interest
because of the wealth of testable implications that it generates. Not surprisingly, entry is
accommodated when fixed set up costs and differences in variable production cost (as measurcd
by the unit costs of production up to capacity) are small. For high capaciry costs, entry
accommodation will result in Stackelberg behavior while for low capacity costs, judo-like
behavior with idle capacity will atise. Entry detetrence with excessive capacity tends to occur
when the unit cost of capacity is not too large and there are moderate fixed set up costs.15 In
both situations in which entry is detensd and accommodatcd, ídle capacity is more likely with a
more efficient incumbent than with a less efficient one (as meastucd by unit cost of producrion
up to eapacity) and is more likely the lower the cost of capaciry. F~ccessive (but fully utilized)
capacity is more likely to be chosen as a preemptive strategy the higher the cost of capacity and
the higher fixed set up costs.
This list of testable implications is intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. Thc
usefulness of the Bct~attd-Edgeworth approach can be measured by the difficulry which other
economically reasonable models ofentry have in generating comparable predictions. Our model
provides a cohesive and coherent framework which gcncrates a range of equilibrium bchaviors
that depend on parameters in an intuitive way. Further extensions of the present model along the
same lines as Coumot-based models of entry can undoubtedly lead to an even richer theory of
market interaction.ló
In Secáon 2 we present the basic modeL Post-entry price-setting subgames aze examined
in Section 3. Section 4 ttses the analysis ofsection 3 to construct the potential entrant's capacity
lS~cn capaciry costs are latge, entry is more likely to be accommodated (if fixed set up costs
are small) or blockaded (iffixed set up costs are large). 7he range of fixed set up costs for which
entry is detetred becotrtes small.
~bOne such extension is Hunsaket's (1993) treatment of the theory of exit. Anothcr cxtension
which appears accessible at this point is a theory ofentry deterrence with multiple incumbena.9
best response funcáon for different cost configuraáons. Then Section 5 examines the
incumbent's capacity choice and the qualitaáve nature of the resulting equilibria. Secáon 6
concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous good in which two firms, an incumbenc (firm 1)
and an entrant (firm 2), sequenáally set capaciács ki (i - 1,2), after which they simultaneously
choose prices pi (i - 1,2). At the capaciry-setting stage firms incur a lump-sum fixed set up cost,
F, that can be avoided only if zero capacity is installed. In addiáon, thete is a constant per unit
cos[ of capaciry, r. Hence, both fums have an idenácal cost of capaciry funcáon, defined as:
Ftrk~ ifk~~0
(1) P(ki) -{0 if ki - 0
i- 1,2.
In the final price-setting stage fum i incurs a constant unit cost of production up to the capacity
limit k~. We denote this cost by ci. Thus, if firm is realized sales at the price-setting stage are qi
S k~, its variable cost of producáon is equal to
(2) ci(q~) - ci4i for qi 5 ki i- 1,2.
Output greater than a fum's capaciry is assumed to be infinitely costly.
Suttuning the cost of capacity (1) and the cost of producáon up to capacity (2) yields the
cost structurc commonly used in the examinaáon of cntry deterrence. (See, for example, Dixit
(1980).) We explicitly separate these two cosu in order to highlight the distincáon between the
cost of capaciry, which is sunk before the final pricc-setting stage, and the cost of producáon,
which depcnds on realizcd sales at the pricing stage.
Aggrcgate market demand is assumed to be of the form10
(3) d(p) - max(1-p,0).
Linear demand permits closed fotm solutions for the equilibrium in the price-setting subgames.
It also provides an important benchmark for gauging the relaáve importance of the regions of the
parameter space {cl, c2, r, F} over which diffezent types of preempáve behavior are observed.
The qualitative results of our model would be similar, however, if instead demand were assumed
to be concave.
Because sharp capaciry constraints limit the amount of output that can be supplied, fu~ns
may have to raàon customers at the prices they select. Following Levitan and Shubik (1972) and
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), we assume that demand is raáoned efficiently. Thus, if
p~ ~ pj, fu~cn i sells min(15, d(p~)) andfirmj faces a residual demand equal to max(0, d(p~) - ly).
This means that items are sold first to those consumers having the highest willingness to pay if
we assume that total detnand is generated by a continuum of agents who purchase at most a
single unit of an indivisible good.l~ When firms set idenàcal prices, we assume that all demand
fust flows to the low cost fum, and that the high cost firm serves any residual demand. To break
áes when cl - c2 we arbitrarily let fum 1 sell its capacity fust.tg
With this raàoning rulc, and ignoring sunk set up and capaciry costs, the profit to fum i in
the price-setting subgamc when it sets pi and firmj sets p~ is
I-;(P;) ~ (P;~;)~(k;.d(P;)) d pi ~ p1
(4) a;(p;.Pjlk;k)) ~ T;(p;)'- (p;-ci)min(ki.max(O,d(p;)-Ihk))) dP; - P~
H;(p;) ~ (P;-c;)min(k;,max(O,d(p~)-k!)) d P;' pi
17Altemaàvely, with elastic individualdemand such a rule would result if therz were an efficient
resale market among consumers.
18Any altemaáve division of sales when fitms choose idenácal prices (such as making them
proportional to capaciry) would geneiate the same equilibrium profits in ehe pricing subgame, as
shown in Deneckere and Kovenock (1989b, Proposiàon 3).11
wherc Ih is an indicator that takes on the value 1 if ci ~ c~, or cl - e2 and i z 2, and takes on the
value 0 if ci ~ c~, or cl - c2 and i- 1.
In the analysis that follows, wc rule out strategies in which fírms price below their unit
producáon costs. t9 Let, Si-[ci,l] denote the pure strategy set of furn i and write Ei for the
corresponding set of mixed strategies (the set of cumulative distribution funcáons Fi on S1). The
profit funcáon ni extends in a natural way to an expected profit funcáon on El x F.2. For any
quadruple of capaciáes and costs (kt,k2,cl,cZ) the price-setting subgame is then a normal form
game G(kt.k2.cl.cz), with players i-1,2, stntegy seu E~, and expected payoff functions
n~(F1,F2).
In Section 3 wc demonstrate ehat thcre is a unique Nash equilibrium pair ofpayoffs in the
game G(kl,lcZ,cl,c2), denoted by a~(kt,kZ,cl,c2) for i-1,2. Since we are interested in the
subgame perfect equilibria only, the three-stage game of sequenáal capacity choice followed by
simultaneous price-setting can be reduced to a game of sequential capacity choice with payoffs
II~(k1,k2~ct,c2,r,F~ - ni ~1~2~ct~c2) - p~i)~ We call this game I"(c1,c2,r.F). Throughout the
continuaáon we mosdy ignore trivial cases associated with drasác cost advantages by assuming
that ci ~(1 t c] t r)~2, i- 1,2, j~ i.
Let the inverse demand funcáon cotxsponding to (3) be denoted by P(q) - max (0, 1-q].
In analyzing the game I', we often necd to refar to best response funcáons in the quanáty-setting
game with inverse detttand funcáon P(q) and various cost funcáons. Let Q~(Y7) - arB maxq
( (P(4tkj) - c,]q }, Q,`(ki) - arB maxq ( LP(qt~) - cl - rlq} and ~(ki) - arg tnaxq (P(4tkj)q ' ciq -
p(c~] be the best-response funcáons cotnsponding to the cost functions cíq, (ct t r)q, and ciq t
p(c~, respecávely. More precisely:20
19We therefore rule out any weakly dominated strategy that is not the limit of a soquence of
undominated strategies.
Z~Note that wc have assumed that the best response funcáon QF is left continuous; this ensures
that in a Stackelbcrg gamc thc leader can always attain the supramum of his profits. so that an
cquilibrium cxists.12
Q~(k}) - max {o, Z(1 - k) - c~l
Q~(15) - max (0, Z íl - k~ - ci - r) }
1
QF )- 2{1-15-c1-r) if k)~1-c1-r-2~
i~
0 otherwise
Let k~(a,(i) ~(kt~(a,(i), k2(a,(i)) be the intersecáon of Q~` and Qp, for a,p e{c,r}. Ttius.
for example, kC(r,r) -(1 - 2ci t c) - r~3 are the Cournot capacities when fums have uni[ coscs c~ t r
(i-1,2). Analogously, let ks(a,p) ~(ki(a,~), If~(a,p)) be the Stackelberg equilibrium poinr when che
leader (firm 1) has cost structure a and the follower has best response funcáon Q~, for a,p e{c,r,F}.
For example, ki(r,r) ~ (1 - 2c t t c2 - r)R andk2(r,r) - max(0, (1 - 3c2 t 2c1 - r)~4).
3. The Price-Setting Subgames
We now derive Nash equilibrium profits in the price-setting subgame G(k1,k2,ci,c2). For
a more complete treatrtent see Deneckere and Kovenock (1989a, b), which shows that, except in
cases whcre the high cost fum makes zero profits, equilibrium strategies arc uniquely
determined.
To describe equilibrium profits note that, for some ranges of costs and capaciáes,
equilibrium exisu in pure strategies, while in other zegions, equilibriumrequires nondegenerate
mixed strategies. Figute 3 illustrates these respecáve rzgions for the case whete cl ~ cZ. If both
firms' capaciáes are sufficiently small, so that kl 5 Qi(k~) for each i, then there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in which both fitms set the price P(kl t k2) - 1- kl - kZ and produce at full
capaciry. Respecáve profits are given by ai -(1 - kt - k2 - cl)k~, i- 1,2. T'his region is labeled
region A in Figure 3.13
In region B- B t v BZ u B3 u B4, the equilibrium involves nondegenetau mixed
straugies. The derivation of equilibrium expected profits follows a simple procedure. Nou fust
that fum i makes at least as much profit when it is the low-priced fum as when it ís high-priced.
Hence, futn i can guarantee itself a mirumax profit of H~ - max Hi(p) -[max(1 - ki - k~,
P
1- -~i, ci) - ciJ - min[ki, 1?~-~] by charging the price which maximizes its protit under the
x H. max(1 - k. -15. 1- -~-~~ , c.).21
assumption that it is the high-priced fum, p~ ~ argrnP i(p) - 1 i
This implies that, in equilibrium, firm i never charges a price at which it receives a profit less
than H~ when it is the low-priccd firm. More specif'ically, fum i never charges a price less than
p,i ~ min {p: L~(p) - Hl }. For our lineaz example
if fc~51-cï2ki
(5) R; -
(~1-k.-c.~ ltc 1 1Rl




Any price below g1 is payoff-dominated by chazging pi .
To distinguish between the two fums in rcgion B, suppose that y~ 5 y„i. Then firm j
knows that it is never undercut at prices below py. Since L~(p) is inereasing on the inurval below
p~ neither firm ever charges a price below p~.
One can easily show that in this region, when p~ 5 p~, we have p1 ~ P(kt i- k2) -
max(0, 1- kt - k2). Let sr be the upper bound af the support offitm k's equilibrium price
distribution, F~, and define s- max{st, s2}. Qearly, one has s~ P(klt k2). Hence at least one
firm must sell strictly Icss than its capaciry when it secs its price equal to s. Furthermore, at most
one firm can have a mass point in its equilibrium pricc distribution at s. (If both had a mass
poinc, each firm could increase expccted sales discrLtely by moving its mass point slightly below
ZtIf k~ 2 1- c~ we use the convention that pH - ci.14
s.) This implies that for some fimi k. s is contained in the support of Fk and firm k's equilibrium
profit is Hk(~. For this fitm to be playing a best response to its rival's saategy, we must have
s- pk. Hence, firm k's equilibrium profit equals Hk. If p~ ~ p,i, fum j can always assure itself an
equilibrium profit strictly greater than H~, since L(y~) ~ ~(p,~ - H~. Therefore firm i cams H~.
Let;] be the lower bound of the support of firm j's equilibrium price distribuáon and
suppose that ~) ~ pi. Then fitm i could set a price p betwccn p~ and ~ and earn
Li(p) ~ Li(~,i) - Hl, a contradicáon. Hence, ~- pi and firm j's equilibrium profit is Li(p,i).
Following this procedure, to determine equilibrium profits in region B one needs only to
calculate Q- max(pt, ~~). Equilibrium profits acs then L~(~, i- 1,2. An explicit funcàonal
fotm for profit when demand is described by (3) appears in Deneckere and Kovcnock (1989a),
and is replicated in the Appendiz for convenience. Under our assumpàons. region B can be
parááoned into two connected sub-regions in which Rt 2 p,~ and p,Z ~ pt. The common boundary
of these two regions is comprised of capacity pairs kl ~ 0 and k, ~ 0 for which pt - p2, and is
denoted by A2(lct). In our linear example this boundary consists of all (kt, k2) pairs that solve
kl(1 - kt - c2)2 f 4k11c2(c2 - ct) - k2(1 - k2 - cl)2 - 0, with kt ranging between ki(c,c) and kl -
d(c2). For kt 2 d(c2), p2(kl, k2, ct, cZ) equals cZ, and the boundary AZ(kt) coincides with the
horizon[al line k2 -~(ct, c2) - 1- cl - 2[(1 - c2)(c2 - cl)Ji~. Capacity pai[s (kl, k2) with kl Z
d(c2) and Ic2 ~ cp(ct, c2) remain in rzgion B; the price-setting equilibtium requires nondegenerate
mixed strategies. Capaeity pairs in the set ((lct, k2) : kt 2 d(e2) and k,, 2 cp(ci, c~) ) lie in the
classical Bertrand region (region C in Figure 3); equilibrium requires that the low cost firm price
the high cost fum out ofthe market, so that a2 - 0. Given our assumpáon that no firm ever
prices below its unit cosc, fitm 1 eams nl - prnsax (p - ct)min(kt, 1- p).
2
The curves Ici -`Yi(15) atz the loci of points (kt, k2) for which firm i is exactly capaciry
constrained when it charges pi, i.e. d(yti) -1c1. For the demand funcáon (3), `f~i(k~) -
1 2 t Z{k~ [2(1 - c~) - k)] ] tR for 0 5 k~ S 1- c~ and `f'i(kj) - 1- ci for !c~ Z 1- ci. Using these
curves, we may further subdivide region B into four different regions. In region B 1,
!c2 ~ d(~2) and p2 ~ pt. Hence cquilibrium profits are given bY a2 ~ L2(~Z) -(~Z - c2) d(g2)15
and al - Ll (PZ) -(p2 - c1) kl. In region B2, k2 ~ d(~Z) and p2 ~~t , so that ~~(p2 ' c2) lc2
and n~ -(R2 - c~) kt. In region B~. kt ~ d(p,t) and pt ~ p2, and hence ~-(At - c2) k2 and
n~ -(~t - c~) k~. Finally, in region B4, Rt ~ A2 but d(yt) ~ kt, so that ~-(~t - c2)k2 and
n i-(~t ' c t) d~t).
The analysis of the case where e2 ~ ct is entirely analogous, and is illustrated in Figure 4.
In region A,1c15 Qi(k~) for i- 1 and i- 2, so that there is a ptttt strategy equilibrium in which
both fu-ms charge P(kt t lc2) and produce atfull capacity. The curve Al(k2) again divides che
rcgions where Ql ~ p2 and AZ ~ R~.~ Equilibrium profits are Ly(~1) over the region where
p~ ~ g2 and L~(g2) over the region where p2 ~ pt. In region C, fum 1 is forced to exit the markeG
so that si - 0 and n~ - pm~axl (p - c2)min(]c2. d(P)).
We may summarize the behavior outside the pure strategy region A as follows: When
Rt ~ p2, firm 1 prices passively by providing a stochastic price umbrslla for firm 2.23
. . .
Consequently, hcre we have at - HL and ~- I2(~t). When ct - c2, the inequality ~t ~ A2 holds
if and only if k1 ~ k2, so that large fums price passively and small firms price aggressively.
When cl ~ c2, thc region where pt ~ p2 strictly includes the region where kl ~ Ic2; when
c~ ~ c2 the opposite is true. Thus, as is emphasized in Deneclcere and Kovenock (1992), high
costs induce morc passive pricing behavior.
4. Capacity Best Response Functions
Before proceeáing with thc derivation of the follower's best response funcáon in the
game I'(ct,c2,r,F), we would like to provide some intuition for why and how this best response
funcáon differs from thc standard quanáty best response funcáon in the Coumot and Stackelberg
ZZFor k~ ranging between 1c2~(c,c) and d(ct), this curve is defined by the implicit equation
k2(1 - k2 - c t~ t 4k1k2(c 1- cZ) - kt(1 - kt - c~Z 3 0. For k2 2 d(cl), et(~) 3~(~, ct) ~
1- c2 - 2((1 - ct)(ct - c2)ltR.
Z3We usc the term aggressive pricing to indicate that a f~t le undeicurnë n~ ~h~owsn~élf
high probability so as to keep chat rival at its minimax p
to be undercut sufficiently often, is then said to príce passivelY.16
models. The distinction betwecn our capacity best response and the standard quanáry best
response emanates from the following observaáon: In quanáty-setting models a quanáty placcd
on the mazket is a commitment to drive price down to the level that clears all quanáty from the
market. In the three-stage game of sequenáal capacity choice followed by simultaneous price-
setáng capaciry is not a commitment to drive price down to the capacity clearing level.
This fact has two major implicaáons. Fust, when firms' costs are not too dissimilar and
for capaciács outside of the region under the lower envelope of the Cournot best response
funetions Qie(!cl), the larger firm acts relaávely passively in pricing.~ This provides an incenáve
for a follower to set a capacity above the quanáry best n;sponse funcáon when the leader's
capacity is sufficiently lazge. In this range, the gain from the followets expansion ofcapacity
beyond the leve! corresponding to the qttartáty best response is only paráally offsct by a
(stochasác) price reducáon.
The second major implicaáon is that fums whose efficiency considetably exceeds that of
their rivals act more aggressively in setáng capacity than they would in quanáty-setáng games.
Efficient followers need not take their rival's capaciry as a commitmcnt to scll. Instead, thcy may
decide to inerease their own capacity to axommodate all of the demand at their rival's unit cost
of producáon and proceed to price the rival completely ouc of the market. Hence. Bertrand
behavior may displace Cournot behavior.
The potenáal for this type of aggtrssive tesponse has an important effect on thc behavior
of a leader with high unit producáon costs. Such a fum will restrict its capacity in order to
render it optimal for the more e~cient firm to ttstrict capacity and pricc passively rather than co
expand capaciry and price aggressively.
In the analysis that follows. we characterize the parameter values that delineate these two
types of behavior. From the equilibrium profiu IIi(kI, k2 I c I, cq, r, F) of the price-setting
Z4As shown in Secáon 3, this statement is literally true when the larger firm is equally or less
efficicnt than iu opponent. When the large firm is more efficient (e.g., ct ~ eZ), the statement
also hotds true in the region when: ~t ~ R2. Zitis suffices for our purposes, as firm 2's quanáty
best response funcáon is enárely contained tn this tegion whenever (kt,k~ ~ A.17
subgames, wc can calculate the optimal capacity choice of the follower in the second stage of our
three-stage game:
R(k1) - arBmax II2(kl. kz ~ ci. c2, r, ~.
k2
Define RD(kl) to be the follower's capaciry best response function when the fixed set up cost is
equal to zero:
R~(kt) - argmax II2 (kl, k2 ~ cl, c2, r, 0).
kZ
Since the follower's profits are nonincreasing in kt, and since a fixed set up cost does not affect
the best response capacity unless profits become nonposiáve, R(kt) coincides with Ra(kl) below
a critical value of the leader's capaciry:25
R(kt) -
~RD(kt) if kl ~ km
0 ifkt2km
The criácal value km is defined by~
km (c t, c,, r, F) - max (kl: IIZ(kl, R~(kl) I cl, c2, r, 0) 2 F}.
Bccause of this simple n;laáonship between R(kl) and R~(kl), we will first assume (in order to
simplify our presentaáon) that F- 0 and study how Ro(kl) depends on the remaining parameters
ct, c2, and r. Figure 5 illustrates che different cases that may arise.
ZSFollowing Dixit, we assume that whenever the follower is indifferent between entering and
staying out of thc market, no entry occurs. More generally, whenever the follower's best
response correspondence is muláple valued we assume that the follower takes the action that
maximizes the leader's profit. This ensures that the leader's first-stage profit funcáon
II1(k1,R(kt)Ic1,c2,r,F) is uppcr semicontinuous, so that an equilibrium always exisu.
Z6We adopt thc following convenáons in the defutiáon of km: if the set over which kt is bcing
maximized is empry, thcn km(ct, c2, r, F) - 0. If the set is equal to Ri., then km(cl, c2, r, F) -~.
Note that the former case occurs when F ís sufficiently large, and the latter case occurs when
c2 is not too much larger than cl and F is sufficiently sma1Lls
Praposiáon 1: Suppose r 2(1 - 2cl t ct)R. Then R~(kt) - Q2(kl).
When r 2(1 - 2c2 t et)~2., QZ(kt) lies entirely in region A. The cost ofcapacity is so high
chat it is never optimal for firm 2 to select a capacity k2 such that (kt,k2) lies outside of region A,
even if this firm is cost advantaged. Since all capacity pairs in region A lead to price-setting
equilibria in which price clears all capacity from the market, R~(kt) coincides with Q2(kl).
Figure Sa shows an example of this type of best response, where c 1- c2 - 0 and r-.5.
In the next proposiáon, the inequalities r c(1 - 2c2 t cl)I2 and c2 ? ct - ~(ct,r) hold, for
some function A(ct,r) saásfying ~(ct,r) ~ r. The capacity cost is then small enough that Q.r,(k~)
lies oucside of region A for kt ~ ki(c,r), but firm 2's cost advantage (if any) is small enough that
it is never opámal to drive firm 1 out of the market. As in Proposiáon 1, Ro(kt) coincides ~vith
QZ(kt) for kl S ki(c,r). However, for kt ~ ki(c,r), RO(ki) lies entircly above Q.`,(kl). This is
most evident forkl ~ d(c2), where QZ(kt) ~ 0 but Ro(kl) 10. Recall from Section 3 that
.
rz2(kt, k2, ct, c2) ~ 0 for lct ~ 0 if c2 c ct and for 0 c k2 c~(ct,c2) if ct 5 c,. The condition
r c(1 - 2c2 t ct)~2 then insures that there exists k2 ~ 0 such that IIy -~- rk2 ~ 0 for k2 e
(O,k2), negardless of the value of kl. As in Gelman and Salop (1983), by choosing a sufficiently
small but posiáve capacity, the follower can guazantet that the leader does not find it profitable
to drive the follower out ofthe market in the price-setting subgame. The leader then prefers to
providc a stochasác ptice umbrella for his relaávely small rival, rather than to lower his price
sufficiently faz so as to make it impossible for the rival to obtain any profitable sales.
To be mote specific, define the judo capacity of firm 2 by 7~ (cl, c~, r) - arg max
k2
{ïLL(d(c2),k2) }. Note that 712 provides firm 2 with the híghcst profit attainable in rcgion B4
since pt (and hence, IIZ(kl, k2)) is independent of kt in By. Let kJ (ct, c2, r) - inf {kt:
(k :(k k E B 1~~t' ~) 5 II2 (d(c2), AZ)}. Then for kt c kJ fum 2's opámal response lies in
2 1 7~ 3
region B3 and for kt 2 kJ firm 2's optimal rzsponse lies in region B4. Finally, define 0(c t,r) - c1
- min{c2: II2(IcJ, ~.2, cl, c2) 2 d(et)(el - c2 - r)}. We can now state:19
Pronosiáon 2: Suppose r ~(1 - 2c2 } cl)ïL and c2 ~ cl - 0(cl, r). Then the capacity best
response funcáon is given by
Qr (k 1) if 0 5kl 5 ki(c,r)
2
(6) Ra(kt) - {2(1-ct) -{(1-cl}2 - 12kt (cl-c2-r)]1R}~3 ifki(c,r) ~ kl ~ kJ
l~2(cl, c2, r) ifkt 2 kJ
In Proposirion 2 the middle btanch of R~(kt) lies in region B3. If ct ~ c2 f r, R~(kt) has a
negaáve slope over this range (see Figure Sb), while if cl ~ c2 t r, it has a posiáve slope
(see Figure Sc). Either way, a Proposiáon 2 best response funetion jumps down when
kl - kJ (cl, c.,, r). At the point kl - kJ, firm 2's maximum profit from responding with a capaciry
~hat leaves fuTrt 1 capaciry constrained at Qt equals its profit from setting k2 - í12 (cl, c2, r), a
capaciry sufficiendy small that fum 1 is not capaciry constrained at ~t. For kt z kJ firm 2
responds opámally by selecáng its judo capacity 712.
Pro~osirion 3: Suppose r ~(1 - 2c2 t ct)I2 and cZ ~ ct - A(ct, r). Define ku(cl, c2, r) -
inf {kt: d(cl)(ct - c2 - r) ~ max ILZ(kt, k2)}.
(k2:(ktk~e AvBg~B4j
Then R~(kl) -
QZ(kl) if kI e[0, rnin(ki(c.r), ku)l
{2(1-cl) -[(1-ct~ - 12kI (cl-c2-r)]12}~3 ifkt e (min(ki(c,r), ku), ku]
d(ct) if kl~ku
In Proposiáon 3, the follower's cost advantage is then sufficiently large and the cost of capaciry
sufficiently low, so that driving the leader out of the market in the price setting subgame is
optimal whenever kl exceeds some criácal leve! k~. Note that under the assumpáons of20
Proposition 3 ku always exisu and that N' ~ lcl. For kt S k~, R~(kl) coincides with the
Proposiáon 2 best trsponse funcáon, which is given by equaáon (6). For kl ~ k~, the follower
sets a capaciryjust large enough to serve the market at a price equal to thc leader's unit cost of
production, R~(kl) - d(cl). Note that k~ may be greater than or less than ki(c,r); that is, the
upwazdjump in RD(kl) rnay occur in region A or tzgion B3. The boundary of cost parameter secs
distinguishing these two possibilities is given by c2 -
(Sct - 4r - 1~4.Z7 Figure Sd illustrates R~(kl) when the jump point occurs in region B3 and
Figure Sc dopicu the situaáon when it occurs in region A.
As noted earlier a fixed set up cost alters the capacity best response funcáon only when ic
causes the follower's profits to be nonposiáve. The followcr opts for staying out of the market
whenever the leader's capaciry exceeds some criácal capaciry level km, whose value depends on
which of the condiáons of Propositions 1-3 holds. Under the condiáons of Proposiàon 1 we
have:
Prop~iàon 4: Suppose r z(1 - 2c2 t et)I2.. Then
R(kt) -
~RD(kl) if kl c km
0 ifkt2km
where km - 1- c2 - r- 2~.
Observe that in this case R(kt) - Q2(kt), so that the outcome of our three stage game
then coincides with the Stackelberg outcome ks(F,F). Under condiáons parallel to Proposiáon 2
we have:
Z~Eor c2 5 (Scl - 4r - 1)~4, ku - 1- c2 - r- 2[(1 - cl)(cl - c2 - r)J1R and for cZ ~(Sct - 4r - 1)~4
ku - (1 - ct)2I[16(cl - c.Z - r)J.21
ProBosition 5: Suppose r ~(1 - 2c2 t ct)I2 and c2 2 cl - ~(cl,r). Then
R(kl) -
RO(kl) if kl ~ km
0 if kl 2 km
where km is given byzS
~ if II2(kJ.l21c 1.cZ.r,O)~F
(7) km - ~l(cl,c;.r.~ if II2(kJ.~.Z~c1.c2.r,0)SF~IIZ(k~(c,r)~cl.~.r.~)
1-cZ-r-2~ if F2II2(k~(c,r)~c1.c2.r.11)
Note chat for kl ~!eJ(cl, c2, r) the follower's capaciry best response R~(kl) is constant at the level
~,2(c 1, c2, r), and that Ro(kl) lies in region By, where subgame equilibrium profits are independent
of kl. Consequendy, if F ~ IIZ(kr, 7~ I c1, c2, r, 0), then R(kl) coincides with the expression for
Ro(kl) given in equaáon (6). When II2(kJ, ~ I ct, c2, r, 0) S F ~ Iï2(k~(c,r) I cl, c2, r, 0), the
jump point km lies on the second branch ofR~(kl) in equaáon (6). Finally, when F 2 ILL(kC(c,r) I
cl, c2, r, 0), the jump point occurs to the left of kl(c,r) so that R(kl) is equal to QZ(kl).
The remaining two proposiáons parallel Proposiáon 3.
Prop~siáon 6: Suppose r ~(1 - 2c2 t cl)ï2, c2 ~ cl - ~(cl,r). and à(cl)(c1 " c2 - r) ~
iLZ(lcC(c,r)Icl, c2, r, 0). Then
R(kl) -
~R~(kl) if kl c km
0 ifkl 7 km
28The funcàon rl(c1, c2, r, F) below is strictly decreasing in F, and is given by the posiáve root of
the following quadraác equation in kl: 16(cl - c2 - r)3 ki t[8(1 - cl~ (c1 - c.I - r~ -
36(1 - c 1)(c 1- c2 - r)F t 27F2]kl t(1 - c 1)3 [(1 - c 1)(c1- c~ - r) - F7 - 0.22
where
ifd(ct)(ct - c2 - r) ~ F
(8) km -~ t'1(ct, c2, r. F) ifd(ct)(ct - c2 - r) 5 F ~ li2(1c~(c,r) I c[, cZ. r. 0)
I- c2 - r- 2~ if F 2 ILL(IcC(c,r) I ct, cZ, r, 0)
In Proposition 6 when F ~ d(ct)(cl - c2 - r), R(k1) coincides with R~(kt). Fixed cos[s are then
small enough that for kl ~ k~ the followerprefers to price the leader out of the market rather than
seaying out himself. When d(ct)(cl - c2 - r) 5 F ~ ILz(k~(c,r) I cl, c,, r, 0), [he jump point occurs
on the upward sloping branch of R~(kl) given by the middle expression in (6). Finally, when
F 2 IIZ(kC(c.r) ~ cl. c2. r. 0). R(kl) - Q2(kt).
In Proposition 7 k~ 5 ki(c,r), so that R~(kl) contains no upward sloping branch.
Proposirion 7: Suppose r ~(1 - 2c2 t ct)R. ~ ~ ct - ~(cl,r), and d(ct)(c~ - c2 - r) 2




(R~(lct) if kl ~ km
{lU if kl 2 kn'
~ ifd(cl)(cl - c2 - r) ~ F
I- c2 - r- 2~ if F 2 d(cl)(cl - c2 - r)
This case differs from the case trzated in Proposition 6 because Ro(kt) jumps directly
from region A to region C. If F ~ d(cl)(cl - c2 - r), there is no change in the followcr's capacity
best response. If this inequality is reversed, R(kl) - Q2~1)-23
5. Entry Accommodation and Deterrenee
The analysis of the follower's best response funcáon in Secáon 4 now allows us to
examine the optirnal choice of capaciry by thc leader and thus the potenáal for entry detetrence.
The leader chooses the capaciry kt that maximizes the profit II1(kl, R(kl)Ict, c2, r, F) obtained
when the follower responds with R(kt). Following Bain (1956) we distinguish between capacity
choices for which entry is accommodated, blockaded, or deterred. Entry is said to be
accommodated if the capacity choice of the inctunbent is such that the optimal response of the
follower is to choose a posiáve capaciry. Entry is blockaded if the incumbent's monopoly
capaciry Qi(U) for unit cost cl t r, i.e. the capaciry it would set in the absence of the threat of
entry, suffices to induce the follower to ttspond with zero capacity and hence stay out of the
market. Entry is detetzed if it is opámal for the incumbent to sttategically set a capaciry greater
[han Q~(~) in order to induce the follower to respond by setting zero capacity.
Depending on the assumed values of the cost paramettrs, our model obtains a wide range
of qualitaávcly distinct outcomes in the thrce stage game. Entry is accommodated when the
fixed set up cost F is sufficiently small given the differences (which cannot be drasác) in the unit
costs of producáon up to capacity, and the cost of capacity. In the case of accommodated entry
the incumbent may behave according to the Sylos postulate, so thatprico is driven down to a
level that clears all capaciry, or it may provide a stochasác price umbrella under which the
entrant can pick prices. The cost of capacity and the unit costs of production up to capaciry
dctemune which outcome occurs. For high capacity costs, entry accommodation (when it
occurs) leads to Stackelberg behavior. For low capacity costs, the natute of equilibrium depends
on unit producáon cost asymmetries. Judo-like behavior arises if the incumbent has the lower
cost of production or if he is not too cost disadvantageà. In judo equilibrium, the incumbent sets
a lazge capacity, thc entrant a small capaciry, and a nondegenerate mixed strategy arises at the
price-setting staga. In this equilibrium the incumbent sets higher prices on average than the
entranc, and both stochasácally trduce output below capacity. When capacity costs are low and
the incumbent is sufficiently cost disadvantaged, the incumbent must reduce its capacity below24
che Stackelberg level to avoid facing an aggressive capacity response by the entrant and hence
the possibility of being driven out of the market at the price-setting stagc. The entrant, fitm 2,
responds by setting capacity along Q2(kl), so that in equilibrium both fitms produce at full
capacity. We call this type of outcome a"reverse judo" result F"inally, when the capacity cost is
low and the incumbent has a moderate cost disadvantage or whcn capacity costs are intcrmcdiate
and the fitms' unit costs are not too different, enrry accommodaàon yields ki(c,r) as the leader's
capaciry. The fotlower responds with 1c2~(c,r) and fums set prices to cleaz all capaciry from the
mazket. Hence we obtain equilibria with capaciàes between the Cournot levels k~(r,r), i-1,2 and
the Stackelberg levels k~(r,r), i-1,2. These cortzspond to the equilibria in Dixit's (1980)
quanàty-setting model.
Figtues 6a and 6b show the qualitaàvely distinct tanges of accommodating equilibria as
the difference in the unit producàon costs of the two fums and the cost of capaciry vary. Figure
6a illustrates che nattue of equilibrium as a funcàon ofr and ct, holding F- c2 - 0. In this case
the entrant is cost advantaged. Figutt 6b illttsttates the type of equilibritun as a funcàon of r and
c2, holding F- ct a 0. In this case the incumbent is cost advantaged
To understand how to match the qualitative infonnaaion contained in these pictures with
the analysis of the capacity best response funcàons in the previous secàon, consider Figure 6a.
When cl - r~ 0, firm 2's best tssponse ftutcàon is given by Proposiàon 2, as illustratcd in Figure
Sc. Along this best response function, firm 1 clearly optimizes by selecàng either ki(c,r) or kJ.
When ct - 0, the middle branch of R~(kt) is actually flat, since in region B3 firm 2's profits are
given by k2H1(k2)~Ict. Firm 1 is thetefore indifferent betwcen ki(c,r) and any other poinc along
the middle branch of RD(kl). At kt ~ k1, firm 2's capaciry jumps down to thejudo level J~.Z,
making kt - k~ the opàmal choice at ct - 0.29 As ct increases, l2 increases, making firm 1
eventually ptzfer kt ~ ki(c,r). Ttte natutt of the equilibrium thcn shífu from ajudo equilibrium
29Since capacity costs are zero, values of kt ezceeding kJ are also optimal. However, such
responses necessarily disappear when r becomes even slightly posiàve, and we therefore ignore
them in our discussion.25
to a pure strategy equilibrium betwecn the Cournot and Stackelberg levels ki(r,r) and ki(r,r). As
c t further increases, the best response funcáon becomes that given in Proposiáon 3. As long as
k~ 2 ki(c,r), the equilibria remain of the Dixit type. For c t sufficiently large, however, k~ ~
ki (c,r), and firm 2's best response funcáon is as indicated in Figure Se. F'um 1 then optimius by
choosing kt - k~, resulting in a reverse judo equilibrium. As cl further increases, k~ converges
to zero, eventually yielding fum 2 a monopoly posiáon.
If we start at the origin ofFigure 6a, but instead gradttally raise r, then as argued above
thc equilibrium is initially of the judo type. As r is increased, Ro(kt) shifu down, and kl(c,r)
eventually becomes the prefen-ed point This again leads to pure strategy equilibria akin to the
equilibria in Dixit's (1980) quanáty-setting model. Further increases in r eventually push ki(c,r)
beyond the Stackelberg point on QZ(kt), resulting in the Stackelberg outcome. The analysis of
the remainder of Figures 6a and 6b is similar.
Since the fixed setup cost parameter F only affecu the entrant's decision to enter the
market, changes in F affect accommodating equilibria only insofar as the incumbent's choice of
whether to accornmodate or prevent entry (or possibly to stay out itself) is altereà. Hence,
condiáonal on accommodaáon arising, the characteriuaáon of the equilibria in Figures 6a and 6b
will hold for other values of F as wcll.
As is cvident from the figures, the Bertrand-Edgeworth approach provides a useful game-
theoreác model in which seemingly disparate entry cquilibria that have previously appeared in
the literature are obtained as subgame perfcct cquilibria for different ranges of the cost
parameters cl, c2, r and F. Stackelberg's quanáty-setting solution arises for accortimodating
equilibria invoiving a large cost of capaciry. Lower costs of capacity may be associated with
equilibria similar to the quantity-setting equilibria advocatod by Dixit (1980), with stochastic
price-setáng versions of the judo equilibria presented in Gelrnan and Salop (1983), or with thc
reverse judo cquilibria of Dencckere and Kovenock (1989) and Faith (1990). Wtuch of these
qualitaávety distinct equilibria arises is determined by unit cost asytnmetries and the cost of
capacity.26
Entry is deterred in our model when the fixed cost F is sufficiently large to make
detetrence more profitable than accommodaáon, but sufficicndy small so as to precludc
blockaded entry. When entry is successfully deterred, excessive capaciry built to deter entry may
bc utiliud completely or may be left paráally idle. Hence, unlike prcvious papers in the
literature, our model provides support for the use of idle capacity to deter entry, while
maintaining a post-entry simultaneous move structure, subgamc perfecáon, and standatd
assumpáons on demand (such as lineariry). Idle capacity is more likely with a more efficient
incumbent than a less efficient one (as meastued by unit cost of producáon up to capacity) and is
more likely the lower the cost of capaciry. Excessive, but fully uálized, capacity is more likely
to be chosen as a preempáve strategy the higher the cost of capaciry and the higher the fixed set
up costs.
To illustrate the type of outcomes that might arise consider the four capacity best
response funcáons R(kt) shown in F'iguts 7. These represent bcst response funcáons for
ct - 0, cZ - 0, andr~.OS. Figute 7a shows a case wherz the fixed cost F is less than
lï2(]cl, J121c l, c2, r, 0) and entry is accommodated. The cost of capaciry and the fixed cost are
sufficiently small that a judo outcome aáses in which the leader sets a large capaciry, the
follower a small capacity, and the leader provides a stochasác price umbrella under which the
follower prices. The dashed lines in the figtue illustrate Qic(15), i-1,2. Figure 7b illusttates a
case in which F is stufficiently large that R(k l) jumps down at a point km ~~(0). In this case
firm I chooses km as its capacity and fitm2 responds with k2 - 0. In the final price-setting stage
finn 1 sets price equal to P(Qi(0)), the monopoly price for unit cost cl. Entry is detetred with
excess capaciry (km - Qi(0)), some of which (km - Qi(0)) is left idle.
In Figtue 7c the jump point km lies between Qi(0) and Qi(0). It is optimal for fum 1 to
set kt - km and deter entry. Since, when faced with a unit cost of producáon up to capacity of
c t, firm 1 would like to produce Qi(0), it produces at full capaciry qt - km. Entry is dctetred
with excess capacity (km - Qi(0)) that is fully utiliud. It is interesting to note that a necessary
condition for entry to be detetred with excessive but fully utilized capacity is that the cost of27
capaciry be posiáve. This insures that Qi(0) ~ Ql(0). The last fiame of Figure 7 illusuates the
case where F is sufficiendy large that entry is blockaded. km 5 Qi(0). In this case fuTn 1 sets
capaciry kl - Qi(0) and prices at P(Qi(0)).
Figure 8 shows the qualitaáve natttre of the equilibria that arise for ct - cZ - 0 and
different (r, F) pairs. The valucs of r and F corrrsponding to Figures 7(a) -(d) are labeled (a) -
(d). As thcse píctures show, larger unit costs of capaciry are associated with smallet values of
the fixed set up cost F that defines the boundary between regions where entry does and does not
occur. On the other hand, when entry is accommodated the fixed cost F is not relevantin
detcrmining che boundary between thc rcgions of qualitaávely different outcomes.
When entry is deterred, for any (r,F) pair for which idle capaciry arises there is an r'~r
such that (r',F) generates excessive but not idle capaciry to deter entry. Correspondingly, for r~0
thcre is an F'~F such that (r,F~ gencratcs excessive but not idle capaciry. The range of (r,F) pairs
for which entry is detcrred with excessive but not idle capacity lies to the north and east of thc
idle capaciry range in (r,F) space.
For gencral (ct,c2,r) triples, when the cost of capaciry is sufficiently large, entry deterring
equilibria correspond to those o1 thc Stac:kclberg mociel und hence neves involve idle capacity.
Entry deterrence with idlc capacity requitrs that the incumbent set a capacity greacer than Qi(0),
which is never profitable for r lazge enough to generate a Pmposiáon 1 best response funcáon,
R~(kl). A necessary condiáon for idle capaciry to arise in entry deterrence is that R~íkl) be a
Proposiáon 2 or 3 best response funcáon. For Proposiáon 2 best response functions, idle
capacity to deter entry requires kme (Qi(0),kJ]. For Proposition 3 best response functions, idle
capacity to deter entry requires ku ~ Qi(0) and km e(Qi(0)ku]. Figutss 9-11 depict the
qualitaáve nature of equilibria in (F,r) space for (c1,c2) -(0,.1), (.1,0), and (.3,0) respecávely.
6. Concltuion
Sincc its incepáon oligopoly theory has telied heavily on quanáty-setáng models of
compeááon. With the emphasis on extensive form modelling ofoligopoly games that coincided28
with the birth of the "new theoreácal industrial organi7aáon", the áming of fitms' strategic
choices received more scrutiny. The basic observaáon that firrrts set prices as well as quanáties
calls into qucsáon the use of the Coumot model as a reasonable reduccd form for a more
complicated process of strntegic interaction. In a seminal paper, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
showed that it was possible to obtain the Cotunot outcome as a reduced form for a morc
complicated process of simultaneous capaciry setting followed by simultaneous price-setting.
This framework had popular appeal becattse it scparated the quanáty and pricing decisions of
fums and made the intuiávely appealing assumpáon (at least for many markets) [hat prices can
more easily be set conángent on capaciáes than vice versa. At the same time the approach lent
guarded support for the use of the Coumot equilibrium in modelling market behavior under
imperfect compeááon.
This paper takes the Bern-and-Edgeworth philosophy a stcp further by attempting to appiy
the approach to one of the fundamental theoreácal issues of industrial organizaáon, the
profitability of crzdible precommitment to deter entry. In doing so we provide a new and
intuiáve answer to the quesáon addressed in the literaturz on entry deterrence of whether it is
desirable to hold idle capacity to deter entry. We also provide a unificd framework in which
several qualitaávely distinct outcomes (some of which have been pnoposed prevíously in the
literature) appear as special cases.
To understand the origuts of this chamoleon-like charactcr uC the I3crcrand-Ccigewonh
model, it is useful to examine how the degize of post-entry compeááon influences the outcome
of the capaciry ptscommitment game. Price-taláttg behavior in the post-entry game provides an
interesting benchmark, because it appears at one extremc of the behavioral spectrum With equal
marginal producáon costs, perfectly compeááve pricing also ensttres that firnu will produce at
full capaciry in the post-entry game. Vigorous post-entry compeááon thus renders the outcomes
favored by Sylos-Labirti (1969) and Spence (1977) immune to the Dixit (1979) criáque.30
300ne paper that models compeááon in this way is Dixon (1985).29
Another altetnaàve that merits attenàon is post-entry quanàty compeààon, if only because this
case has figured so prominently in the entry deterrence literattue.
Fígures 12 and 13 are the analogues to Figttres 6a and 6b, drawn under different
assumpàons on post-entry compcàtion. Pancl (a) illusaates the outcomes of Dixit's two-stage
game,31 and panel (b) those of the three stage game with perfectly compeààve pricing in the
ftnal stage. A brief glance at these pictures tsveals an amazing similarity with Figtues 6a and 6b.
In fact, supcrimposing pancls (a) and (b) in Figure 12 (13) roveals many common boundaries
with Figures 6a (6b). With the excepàon of the judo region, the outcomes under Bertrand-
Edgeworth compeààon thus coincide alternately with the outcome under perfectly compeààve or
Cournot post-entry compeààon!32
To see why the Bertrand-Edgeworth model sometimes takes on the character of the
perfectly compeààve pricing model, at other àmes rnimics the behavior of the quanàty-setàng
model, and at still other times produccs behavior which has no equivalent in either model, it is
useful to compare the respecàve capacity best tesponse funcàons. Figure 14a illustrates the case
of a more efficient leader, with parameter configuraàons such that the equilibrium falls in the
judo region of Figure 6b (but below the continuaàon of the upper boundary of the Dixit region).
As explained in Secàon 5, with Bertrand-Edgeworth compeààon, judo behavior displaces
quanàty-setting bchavior because to the right of the point V, capacity increases by firm 1 serve
only to reduce fu~rt 2's post-entry profit. Under quanàry competiàon, such expansion has no
effect, because it will ncver be used in the post-entry game. The follower thus tzsponds less
31As shown by Ware (1985), Dixit's assumpàon that the entrant and incumbent simultaneously
select their output in the second stage of the game is not innocuous. This assumpàon allows thc
incumbent to precommit to output befote the cntrant has committed its capacity. Wate shows
that in a three-stage game the possibiliáes for detetrence are more limited than Dixit suggesu.
Outcomes close to the point V in Dixit's diagtam aze climinated becausc the entrant ean select a
capacity slighdy above the quanàry best n-sponse funcàon and induce the incumbent to produce
below capacity in the quanaty-setting subgame.
32Note that it is not merely the case that whenever the two ocher modes of compeààon agree in
thcir predicàons the Bertrand-Edgeworth model concurs. Indeed, in Figure 6b, judo behavior
displaces an area of cotnmon Stackelberg behavior in panels (a) and (b) of Irigure 13.30
aggressively under Berttand-Edgewotth competiàon than under Cournot compeààon. In this
case, the Berttand-Edgeworth model deters entry more cffecàvely than the quanàry-setting
modeL33
Figure 14a also teveals that the Sylos postulate and price-taJdttg behavior result in
idenàcal capacity bestresponse funcàons. However, the outcomes under both modes of
behavior do not coincide. The Sylos postulate produces the Stackelberg outcome, while price-
taking behaviorresults in entry being detenrà, with the incumbent holding idle capacity. Tlie
reason for this discrepancy is that with price-takirtg behavior the incumbent's profiu are not
continuous at k2-0: in the absence of entry, the incumbent can produce at the monopoly level,
whereas small scale entry forces him to utilize all available capacity. As a result, the incumbent's
behavior under Bertrand-Edgeworth compeààon is less aggressive than under price-taking
behavior. A comparison with the outcome under the Sylos postulate is ambiguous.3~
Figutzs 14b and c illustrate capacity best response funcàons when the leader is less
efficient3S The parameter combinaàons of Fgure 14b lie in the Dixit region of Figure 6a, and
the entrant's cost advantage is sufficiently large that the Bertrand-Edgeworth capaciry best
response never jumps down into rogion By. In this case, large incumbont capaciàes increase
compeààon sufficiently to make che enttant prefer to drive the incumbcnt out of the mazket
altogcther. The same force is present under price-taking behavior, but the upward jtunp in the
33~en capacity cosu are sufficiently hígh, expansion to the judo point is no longer optimal; thc
incumbent then behavcs as in Dixit's model. One of the surpnsing results of our paper is that it is
never optimal for the incumbent to choose a capacity strictly between ki(c,r) and ki whcn F~.
Intuiàvely, this is because for low capaciry costs the discontinuiry in the best response funcàon
makes it optimal to expand to ki, while for high capacity costs the marginal benefit of expansion
inside region B3 exceeds the marginal cost.
34As illustrated in Figure 14a, judo behavior may lead to more aggressive incumbent behavior
than under the Sylos p~stulate. However, the area of the judo region to the right of thc dashcd
line in Figt~re 6b has k2~, resulting in the opposite ranldng.
35~ example of such an industry is steel, where low cost minimills have displaced higher cost
incumbents in all but the highest quality steel markets.31
best response funcáon occurs carlier because the entrant faces motz vigorous price compeááon.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth model now behaves like the Dixit model: capacity expansion beyond
the point ki(c,r) is never profitable since it provokes more aggressive responses. Price-taking
behavior and the Sylos postulate result in successively mors aggressive incumbent behavior.
Figure 14c illustrates parameter configureáons such that the equilibrium falls in the
reverse judo rcgion of Figure 6a. The jump point in the Bertrand-Edgeworth and the perfectly
compeááve pricing model thcn coincide, as both lie to the left of the point ki(c,r). In this case,
the entranc behaves least aggrzssively undetthe Sylos Postulate and most aggressively under
Bertrand-Edgeworth compeààon. The capaciry levels chosen by the incumbent reflect this
incrcasing order of aggressiveness.
We conclude that price-taláng and quanáty setting behavior sometimes lead to plausible
market outcomes. When the outcomes under these post-entry modes ofcompeààon differ from
those under Bertrand-Edgeworth compeàáon, we believe thac the Bernand-Edgeworth approach
provides a more appealing descripáon of firm behavior.
Compared to the Bertrand-Edgeworth model post-entry price-talàng generally leads to
implausibty aggressive incumbent behavior.3ó Price-tal~tg behavior allows the incumbent
greater preconunitment to aggressive pricing and therefors entails more passive entrant behavior.
The comparison with post-entry Coumot compeàáon depettds upon the rattking of the
variable producàon cosu. Whcn the incutnbent has a cost advantage post-entry Cournot
competiàon leads to implausibly passive incumbent behavior. The aggressive and symmetric
price responses under Cournot compeààon lead the incumbent to choose relatively low
quanààes in the post-entry game. This rnakes the return to expanding capacity small.37
However, when the entrant has a sufficiently large cost advantage the incumbent behaves
36~ excepáon to this rule arises in the relaàvely small areas of patamcter space where Figuiss
6a and b predict the judo outcome and Figures 12b and 13b predict the Stackelberg outcome.
37In Dixit's (1980) model capacity expansion beyond the point ki(c,r) does not affect the post-
entry outcome.32
implausibly aggressively under Cotunot compeááon. The inctunbent is committcd to sell its
quanáry even if this would drive the price below its variable cost. Undcr Bet~trand-Edgewor[h
competiáon the entrant can price below the incumbent's variable cost without facing this
incredible threat, i.e.. can eliminate compeátion from its high~ost rivaL
We conclude that the Bertrand-Edgeworth model takes on the virtucs of the quanáty-
setting and price-taking models without inheriting theirviccs. By illustrating the benefits of the
Bertrand-Edgewotth model, we hope to stimulatt fiuther examinaáon of its implicaáons for ihe
organizaáon ofindustry. We have litile doubt that this will remain a fruitful area of inquiry.33
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APPENDIX
Nash equilibrium profits in G(kl,lc2,cl,c~) are as follows:
(i) In region A n~ -(l~ikl-k2)ki, i-1,2.
(ii) ln region B1 nt - k~[I1tc2]I2 - 2[kl(2(1-c~-kl)]~ - cl} aad ~ 3[(1-k1-c2~L]2.
(iii) In re~on B2 ni -(1~1k2)[(1-ki-ci~212 f k;(c2-c~, i-1.2.
(iv) In region Bg n~ - k[(1-k2-c~)R]2 t k~(cl~~. i-1,2.
(v) In rcgion By nt - [(1-k2-c1~2]Z and ~ - Ic~(Ili-cl]!2 - (1R) [lc2(2(1-cl)-Ic2)]1R
- cZ?.




The Effect of Capacity Precommitment in a Price-Setáng Duopoly with No Time to Buíld.M'
FigurC 2.















Partition of the Capaciry Space into Different Regions Determining the EQuilibrium Profits in














~ ~ i i Q`znJ ~
~ `~~~~ i , i
N ti
(C)
Propoaition 2 Best Response Functlon with c~~.
d(ot)
(b)











i ~ ~ i
i `` ~ ~ T ~ .Q`xtk~)
fci(c,c) N'
(d)





1~(c.e) ` Ro~~) ~') 1
1 ~~.~ ~




Propaaition 3 Best Response Function when IrcJc~(c,c).
Figure 5.













Judo ~ ~ ~-
1I5 ll2 ~1
Fgure 6a.
Nature of the Equilibrium in the Game I'(ct,0,r,0).Follower Monopolist
Figure 6b.
Natuit of the Equilibrium in the Game i'(O,c2,r,0).(a)
Entry Accomodation
(c)
Deterrence with Excess (but not Idle) Capadry
(b)















0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
Figure 8.







Nature of the Equilibrium in che Game I"(0,O.1,r,F~.r
Figure 10.







Nature of the Equilibrium in the Game i'(0.3,O,r,F).(a)
Quantity-Setting Behavior




IJatuct of the Equilibrium of the Capaciry Pn:commitment Game with Altemaáve
Assumpáons on Post-Entry Compeááon (F~2~).(a)
Quanáry-Setáng Behavior




Natuce of the Equilibrium ofthe Capacity Precommitment Game with Altetnative
Assumpáons on Post-Entry Compeááon (F~ct~).' RisTatle{
( ( a..~.~„.~
a,.
t~(ril t~(u1 t~r.q t~ r t~ t~(u~ t~
(a) (b)
Parameter Values such that the Equilibrium of Parameter Values such that the Equilibrium of
I' falls in the Judo Region of Figure 6b. I' falls in the Dixit Region of Figure 6a.
(c)
Parameter Values such that the Equilibrium of
I' falls in the Reverse Judo Region of Figure 6a.
Figure 14.
A Comparison of the Capaci[y Best Response Functions in Different Precommitment Games.
The Equilibrium Outcomes on each Best Response Function are Denoted by a Bullet.Discussioo Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlanda:
(For previous papers please consult previous discussion papers.)
No. Author(s)
9375 E. van Dammc
9376 P.M. Kort
937ï ii. i.. Buvcuiicrg
and F. van der Plocg
9378 F. "I'huijsman, B. Peleg,
M. Amitai 8c A. Shmida




9381 F. dc Jong
9401 1.P.C. Kleijnen and
R.Y. Rubinstein




9405 P.W.J. De Bijl
9406 A. De Waegenaere
9407 A. van den Nouweland,
P. Bortn,
W. van Golstein Brouwers,
R. Groot Bruinderink,
and S. Tijs
9408 A.L. Bovenberg and




Pollution Control and the Dynamics of the Finn: the Effects of
Market Based Inswments on Optimal Firm Investments
t)piimui'I'axaiion, Public Gcwds and Environmental Policy with
Involuntary Unemployment
Automata, Matching and Foraging Behavior of Bees
Capital Mobility and Social Insurance in an Integrated Market
The Continuous Multivariate Location-Scale Model Revisited:
A Tale of Robustness
Spccilication, Solution and Estimation of a Discrote Time
Target Zone Model of EMS Exchange Rates
Monte Carlo Sampling and Variance Reduction Techniques
Closing the Garch Gap: Continuous Time Garch Modeling
The Measurement of Household Cost Functions: Revealed
Preference Versus Subjective Measures
Job Search, Search Intensity and Labour Market Transitions:
An Empirical Exercise
Moral Hazard and Noisy Information Disclosure
Redistribution of Risk Through lncomplete Markets with
Trading Constraints
A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in
Telecommunication
Consequences of Environmental Tax Reform for Involuntary
Unemployment and Welfare
Amoldi Type Methods for Eigenvalue Calculation: Theory and
ExperimentsNo. Author(~)
9410 J. Eichberger and
D. Kelsey
941 I N. Dagan, R. Serrano
and O. Volij
9412 H. Bester and
E. Petrakis




941 G. J.J.G. Lemmen und
S.C.W. Eijffmger
9417 J. de Ia Horra and
C. Fernandez
9418 D. Talman and Z. Yang
9419 H.J. Bierens
9420 G. van der Laan,
D. Talman and Z. Yang
9421 R. van den Brink and
R.P. Gilles
9422 A. vnn Soost
9423 N. Dagan and O. Volij
9424 R. van den Brink and
P. Borm
9425 P.H.M. Ruys and
R.P. Giiles
9426 T. Callan and
A. van Soest
9427 R.M.W.J. Beetsma
and F. van der Plceg
9428 J.P.C. Kleijnen and
W. van Grcenendaal
Titlc
Non-additive Beliefs and Game Theory
A Non-cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules
Coupons and Oligopolis[ic Price Discrimination
Bayesian Efficiency Analysis with a Flexible Form: The AIM
Cost Function
World Bank-Borrower Relations and Project Supervision
A Bargaining Model of Financial Intermediation
'I'he Prioo Appn,nch lu I~iuancial Intcgr:nion: Dccumposing
European Money Market Interest Rate Differentials
Sensitivity to Prior Independence via Farlie-Gumbel
-Morgenstem Model
A Simplicial Algorithm for Computing Proper Nash Equilibria
of Finite Games
Nonparametric Cointegration Tests
Intersection Theorems on Polytopes
Ranking the Nodes in Directed and Weighted Directed Graphs
Youth Minitnum Wnge Rnles: 'I'he I)utch I:xperience
Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the
Context of Bankruptcy Problems
Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games
The Interdependence between Production and Allocation
Family Labour Supply and "I'axes in Ireland
Macroeconomic Stabilisation and Intervention Policy under an
Exchange Rate Band
Two-stage versus Scquential Sample-size Deterrnination in
Regression Analysis of Simulation ExperimentsNo. Author{s)
9429 M. Pradhan and
A. van Soest
9430 P.J.J. Herings
9431 H.A. Keuzenkamp and
J.R. Magnus
9432 C. Dang, D. Talman and
Z. Wang
9433 R. van den Brink
9434 C. Veld
9435 V. Feltkamp, S. Tijs and
S. Muto
9436 G.-J. Otten, P. Borm,
B. Peleg and S. Tijs
9437 S. Hurkens
9438 J.-J. Hcrings, U. 'I'alman,
and Z. Yang
9439 E. Schaling and D. Smyth
9440 J. Arin and V. Feltkamp
9441 P.-J. Jost
9442 J. Bendor, D. Mookherjce,
and D. Ray
9443 G. van der Laan,
D. Talman and Z. Yang
9444 G.J. Almekinders and
S.C.W. Eijffinger
9445 A. De Waegenaere
9446 E. Schaling and D. Smyth
9447 G. Koop, J. Osiewalski
and M.F.1. Steel
Title
Household Labour Supply in Urban Areas of a Developing
Country
Endogenously Determined Price Rigidities
On Tests and Significance in Econometrics
A Homotopy Approach to the Computation of Economíc
Equilibria on the Unit Simplez
An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Pertnission Value for
Games with a Permission Structure
Warrent Pricing: A Review of Empirical Research
Bird's Trce Allocations Revisited
The MC-value for Monotonic NTU-Games
Learning by Forgetful Players: From Primitive Formations to
Persistent Retracts
'1'hc Computntion of a Continuum of Constreined Equilibria
The Effects of lnflation on Growth and Fluctuations in
Dynamic Macroeconomic Models
The Nucleolus and Kemel of Veto-rich Transferable Utility
Games
On the Role of Commitment in a Class of Signalling Problems
Aspirations, Adaptive Learning and Cooperation in Repeated
Games
Modelling Cooperative Games in Permutational Structure
Accounting for Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve
Intervention: A Friction Model with a GARCH Application
Equilibria in Incomplete Financial Markets with Portfolio
Constraints and Transaction Costs
The Effects of Inflation on Growth and Fluctuations in
Dynamic Macroeconomic Models
Hospital Efficiency Analysis Through Individual Effects: A
Bayesian ApproachNo. Authnr(~)
9448 H. Hamers, J. Suijs,
S. Tijs and P. Bortn
9449 G.-J. Otten, H. Peters,
and O. Volij







9454 F. de Jong, T. Nijman
and A. Rcell
9455 F. Vella snd M. Verbeek
9456 H.A. Keuzenkamp and
M. McAleer
9457 K. Chattetjee and
B. Dutta
9458 A. van den Nouweland,
B. Peleg and S. Tijs
9459 T. ten Raa and E.N. Wolff
9460 G.J. Almekinders
Tltlc
The Split Core for Sequencing Games
Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division
Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences
Transitional Impacts of Environmental Policy in an Endogenous
Growth Model
International I'ricc Discrimination in thc Europcal Car MarkcC
An Econometric Model of Oligopoly Behavior with Product
Differentiation
A Globally and Universally Stable Price Adjustment Pmccss
A Note on the Deccnlraliintion of Pnreto t~ptima in Ecnnomics
with Public Projects and Nonessential Private Goods
Price Effects ofTrading and Components ofthe Bid-ask Spread
on the Paris Bourse
Two-Step Estimation of Simultaneous Equation Panel Data
Models with Censored Endogenous Vaziables
Simplicity, Scientific Inference and Econometric Modelling
Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners
Axiomatic Characterizations of the Walras Correspondence for
Generalized Economies
Outsourcing of Services and Productiviry Growth in Goods
Industries
A Positive Theory of Central Bank Intervention
9461 J.P. Choi Standardization and Experimentation: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Standardization
9462 J.P. Choi Herd Behavior, the "Penguin Effect", and the Suppression of
Inforrnational Diffusion: An Analysis of Infortnational
Extemalities and I'ayoti Interdependency
9463 R.H. Gordon and Why is Capital so Immobile Internationally?: Possible
A.L. Bovenberg Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation
9464 E. van Damme and Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment
S. Iturkens
9465 W. Guth and E. van Damme Information, Strategic Behavior and Faimess in Ultimatum
Bargaining - An Experimental Study -No. Author(s)
9466 S.C.W. Eijffinger and
J.J.G. Lemmen
9467 W.B. van den Hout and
J.P.C. Blanc
9468 H. Webers
9469 P.W.J. De Bijl




9473 L. Meijdam and
M. Verhceven
9474 L. Meijdam and
M. Verhceven
9475 Z. Yang
9476 H. Hamers, P. Borm,








9482 1. Bouckaert and
H. Degryse
9483 B. Allen, R. Deneckere,
T. Faith and D. Kovenock
Title
The Catching Up of European Money Marlcets: The Degree
Versus the Speed of Integration
The Power-Series Algorithm for Markovian Queueing Netwotics
The Location Model with Two Periods of Price Competition
Delegation of Responsibility in Organizations
North-South Knowledge Spillovers and Competition.
Convergence Versus Divergence
Trade Dynamics and Endogenous Growth - An Overlapping
Generations Model
Growth, History and International Capital Flows
Comparative Dynamics in Perfect-Foresight Models
Constraints in Perfect-Foresight Models: The Case ofOld-Age
Savings and Public Pension
A Simplicial Algorithm for Testing the Integral Property of a
Polytope
The Chinese Postman and Delivery Games
Servicing the Public Debt: Comment
[nflation Versus Taxation: Reptesentative Democracy and Party
Nominations
Intersection Theorems with a Continuum of Intersection Points
Capacitated Facility Location: Separation Algorithms and
Computational Experience
A Smoothed Maximum Score Estimator for the Binary Choice
Panel Data Model with Individual Fixed Effects and
Application to Labour Force Participation
Phonebanking
Capacity Precommitment as a Barrier to Entry: A Bertrand
-Edgeworth Approach15~ ~nnn i F Tii Ri iRr -ruG n~
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
VIIIIIIMI~WI~IAl11VIN
Tu